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Abstract
Considering a class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms in non-cooperative settings, we pro-
vide local convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium. In particular, we
consider continuous games where agents learn in (i) deterministic settings with oracle access to their gra-
dient and (ii) stochastic settings with an unbiased estimator of their gradient. Utilizing the minimum and
maximum singular values of the game Jacobian, we provide finite-time convergence guarantees in the de-
terministic case. On the other hand, in the stochastic case, we provide concentration bounds guaranteeing
that with high probability agents will converge to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium in fi-
nite time. Different than other works in this vein, we also study the effects of non-uniform learning rates
on the learning dynamics and convergence rates. We find that much like preconditioning in optimization,
non-uniform learning rates cause a distortion in the vector field which can, in turn, change the rate of con-
vergence and the shape of the region of attraction. The analysis is supported by numerical examples that
illustrate different aspects of the theory. We conclude with discussion of the results and open questions.
1. Introduction
The characterization and computation of equilibria such as Nash equilibria and its refinements constitutes a
significant focus in non-cooperative game theory. Several natural questions arises including “how do players
find such equilibria?” and “how should the learning process be interpreted?” With these questions in mind,
a variety of fields have focused their attention on the problem of learning in games. This has, in turn, lead
to a plethora of learning algorithms including gradient play, fictitious play, best response, and multi-agent
reinforcement learning among others [13].
From an applications point of view, a more recent trend is in the adoption of game theoretic models of
algorithm interaction in machine learning applications. For instance, game theoretic tools are being used
to improve the robustness and generalizability of machine learning algorithms; e.g., generative adversarial
networks have become a popular topic of study demanding the use of game theoretic ideas to provide per-
formance guarantees [12]. In other work from the learning community, game theoretic concepts are being
leveraged to analyze the interaction of learning agents—see, e.g., [3, 15, 21, 23, 33]. Even more recently,
convergence analysis to Nash equilibria has been called into question [27]; in its place is a proposal to con-
sider game dynamics as the meaning of the game. This is an interesting perspective as it is well known that
in general learning dynamics do not obtain an Nash equilibrium even asymptotically—see, e.g., [14]—and,
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perhaps more interestingly, many learning dynamics exhibit very interesting limiting behaviors including
periodic orbits and chaos—see, e.g., [6, 7, 16, 17].
Despite this activity, we still lack a complete understanding of the dynamics and limiting behaviors of
coupled, competing learning algorithms. One may imagine that the myriad results on convergence of gradi-
ent descent in optimization readily extend to the game setting. Yet, they do not since gradient-based learning
schemes in games do not correspond to gradient flows, a class of flows that are guaranteed to converge to
local minimizers almost surely. In particular, the gradient-based learning dynamics for competitive, multi-
agent settings have a non-symmetric Jacobian and as a consequence their dynamics may admit complex
eigenvalues and non-equilibrium limiting behavior such as periodic orbits. In short, this fact makes it dif-
ficult to extend many of the optimization approaches to convergence in single-agent optimization settings
to multi-agent settings primarily due to the fact that steps in the direction of individual gradients of play-
ers’ costs do not guarantee that each agents cost decreases. In fact, in games, as our examples highlight, a
player’s cost can increase when they follow the gradient of their own cost. Counterintuitively, agents can
also converge to local maxima of their own costs despite descending their own gradient. These behaviors
are due to the coupling between the agents.
Some of the questions that remain unaddressed and to which we provide partial answers include the
derivation of error bounds and convergence rates. These are important for ensuring performance guaran-
tees on the collective behavior and can help provide guarantees on subsequent control or incentive policy
synthesis. We also investigate the question of how naturally arising features of the learning process for au-
tonomous agents, such as their learning rates, impact the learning path and limiting behavior. This further
exposes interesting questions about the overall quality of the limiting behavior and the cost accumulated
along the learning path—e.g., is it better to be a slow or fast learner both in terms of the cost of learning and
the learned behavior?
Contributions. We study convergence of a broad class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms
in non-cooperative settings by leveraging the framework of n-player continuous games along with tools
from numerical optimization and dynamical systems theory. We consider a class of learning algorithms
x+i = xi − γigi(xi, x−i)
where xi is the choice variable or action of player i, γi is its learning rate, and gi is derived from the gradient
of a function that abstractly represents the cost of player i. The key feature of non-cooperative settings is
coupling of an agent’s cost through all other agents’ choice variables x−i.
We consider two settings: (i) agents have oracle access to gi and (ii) agents have an unbiased estimator
for gi. The class of gradient-based learning algorithms we study encompases a wide variety of approaches to
learning in games including multi-agent policy gradient, gradient-based approaches to adversarial learning,
and multi-agent gradient-based online optimization. For both the deterministic (oracle gradient access)
and the stochastic (unbiased estimators) settings, we provide convergence results for both uniform learning
rates—i.e., where γi = γ for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}—and for non-uniform learning rates. The latter of
which arises more naturally in the study of the limiting behavior of autonomous learning agents.
In the deterministic setting, we derive asymptotic and finite-time convergence rates for the coupled
learning processes to a refinement of local Nash equilibria known as differential Nash equilibria [28] (a class
of equilibria that are generic amongst local Nash equilibria). In the stochastic setting, leveraging the results
of stochastic approximation and dynamical systems, we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees to stable
local Nash equilibria as well as high-probability, finite-time guarantees for convergence to a neighborhood
of a Nash equilibrium. The analytical results are supported by several illustrative numerical examples. We
also provide discussion on the effect of non-uniform learning rates on the learning path—that is, different
learning rates warp the vector field dynamics. Coordinate based learning rates are typically leveraged in
gradient-based optimization schemes to speed up convergence or avoid poor quality local minima. In games,
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however, the interpretation is slightly different since each of the coordinates of the dynamics corresponds to
minimizing a different cost function along the respective coordinate axis. The resultant effect is a distortion
of the vector field in such a way that it has the effect of leading the joint action to a point which has a lower
value for the slower player relative to the flow of the dynamics given a uniform learning rate and the same
initialization. In this sense, it seems that the answer to the question posed above is that it is most beneficial
for an agent to have the slower learning rate.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with mathematical and game-
theoretic preliminaries in Section 2 which is followed by the main convergence results for the deterministic
setting (Section 3) and the stochastic setting (Section 4). Within each of the latter two sections, we present
convergence results for both the case where agents have uniform and non-uniform learning rates. In Sec-
tion 5, we present several numerical examples which help to illustrate the theoretical results and also high-
light some directions for future inquiry. Finally, we conclude with discussion and future work in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
Consider a setting in which at iteration k, each agent i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} updates their choice variable
xi ∈ Xi = Rdi by the process
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γi,kgi(xi,k, x−i,k). (1)
where γi is agent i’s learning rate, x−i = (xj)j∈I/{i} ∈
∏
j∈I/{i}Xj denotes the choices of all agents
excluding the i-th agent, and (xi, x−i) ∈ X =
∏
i∈I Xi. Within the above setting, the class of learning
algorithms we consider is such that for each i ∈ I, there exists a sufficiently smooth function fi ∈ Cq(X,R),
q ≥ 2 such that gi is either Difi, where Di(·) denotes the derivative with respect to xi, or an unbiased
estimator of Difi—i.e., gi ≡ D̂ifi where E[D̂ifi] = Difi.
The collection of costs (f1, . . . , fn) on X = X1×· · ·×Xn where fi : X → R is agent i’s cost function
and Xi = Rdi is their action space defines a continuous game. In this continuous game abstraction, each
player i ∈ I aims to selection an action xi ∈ Xi that minimizes their cost fi(xi, x−i) given the actions of all
other agents, x−i ∈ X−i. That is, players myopically update their actions by following the gradient of their
cost with respect to their own choice variable. For a symmetric matrix A ∈ Rd×d, let λd(A) ≤ · · · ≤ λ1(A)
be its eigenvalues. For a matrix A ∈ Rd×d, let spec(A) = {λj(A)} be the spectrum of A.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ I, fi ∈ Cr(X,R) for r ≥ 2 and ω(x) ≡ (D1f1(x) · · · Dnfn(x)) is
L–Lipschitz.
Let D2i fi denote the second partial derivative of fi with respect to xi and Djifi denote the partial
derivative of Difi with respect to xj . The game Jacobian—i.e., the Jacobian of ω—is given by
J(x) =
 D
2
1f1(x) · · · D1nf1(x)
...
. . .
...
Dn1fn(x) · · · D2nfn(x)
 .
The entries of the above matrix are dependent on x, however, we drop this dependence where obvious. Note
that each D2i fi is symmetric under Assumption 1, yet J is not. This is an important point and causes the
subsequent analysis to deviate from the typical analysis of (stochastic) gradient descent.
The most common characterization of limiting behavior in games is that of a Nash equilibrium. The
following definitions are useful for our analysis.
Definition 1. A strategy x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium for the game (f1, . . . , fn) if for each i ∈ I there
exists an open set Wi ⊂ Xi such that xi ∈ Wi and fi(xi, x−i) ≤ fi(x′i, x−i) for all x′i ∈ Wi. If the above
inequalities are strict, x is a strict local Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 2. A point x ∈ X is said to be a critical point for the game if ω(x) = 0.
We denote the set of critical points as C = {x ∈ X| ω(x) = 0}. Analogous to single-player optimiza-
tion settings, for each player, viewing all other players’ actions as fixed, there are necessary and sufficient
conditions which characterize local optimality.
Proposition 1 ([28]). If x is a local Nash equilibrium of the game (f1, . . . , fn), then ω(x) = 0 and
D2i fi(x) ≥ 0. On the other hand, if ω(x) = 0 and D2i fi(x) > 0, then x ∈ X is a local Nash equilib-
rium.
The sufficient conditions in the above result give rise to the following definition of a differential Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 3 ([28]). A strategy x ∈ X is a differential Nash equilibrium if ω(x) = 0 and D2i fi(x) > 0 for
each i ∈ I.
Differential Nash need not be isolated. However, if J(x) is non-degenerate—meaning that det J(x) 6=
0—for a differential Nash x, then x is an isolated strict local Nash equilibrium. Non-degenerate differential
Nash are generic amongst local Nash equilibria and they are structurally stable [29] which ensures they
persist under small perturbations. This result also implies an asymptotic convergence result: if the spectrum
of J is strictly in the right-half plane (i.e. spec(J(x)) ⊂ C◦+), then a differential Nash equilibrium x is
(exponentially) attracting under the flow of −ω [28, Proposition 2]. We say such equilibria are stable.
3. Deterministic Setting
The multi-agent learning framework we analyze is such that each agent’s rule for updating their choice
variable consists of the agent modifying their action xi in the direction of their individual gradient Difi. Let
us first consider the setting in which each agent i has oracle access to gi. The learning dynamics are given
by
xk+1 = xk − Γω(xk) (2)
where Γ = blockdiag(γ1Id1 , . . . , γnIdn) with Idi denoting the di × di identity matrix. Within this setting
we consider both the cases where the agents have a constant uniform learning rate—i.e., γi ≡ γ—and where
their learning rates are non-uniform, but constant—i.e., γi is not necessarily equal to γj for any i, j ∈ I,
j 6= i.
Let S(x) = 12(J(x) + J(x)
T ) be the symmetric part of J(x). Define
α = min
x∈Br(x∗)
λd
(
S(x)TS(x)
)
and
β = max
x∈Br(x∗)
λ1(J(x)
TJ(x))
where Br(x∗) is a r–radius ball around x∗. For a stable differential Nash x∗, let Br(x∗) be a ball of radius
r > 0 around the equilibrium x∗ that is contained in the region of attraction V(x∗) for x∗1. Let Br0(x∗)
with 0 < r0 <∞ be the largest ball contained in the region of attraction of x∗.
1. Many techniques exists for approximating the region of attraction; e.g., given a Lyapunov function, its largest invariant level
set can be used as an approximation [30]. Since spec(J(x∗)) ⊂ C+◦ , the converse Lyapunov theorem guarantees the existence
of a local Lyapunov function.
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3.1 Uniform Learning Rates
With γi = γ for each i ∈ I, the learning rule (2) can be thought of as a discretized numerical scheme
approximating the continuous time dynamics
x˙ = −ω(x).
With a judicious choice of learning rate γ, (2) will converge (at an exponential rate) to a locally stable
equilibrium of the dynamics.
Proposition 2. Consider an n–player continuous game (f1, . . . , fn) satisfying Assumption 1. Let x∗ ∈ X
be a stable differential Nash equilibrium. Suppose agents use the gradient-based learning rule xk+1 = xk−
γω(xk) with learning rates 0 < γ < γ˜ where γ˜ is the smallest positive h such that maxj |1−hλj(J(x∗))| =
1. Then, for x0 ∈ Br(x∗) ⊂ V(x∗), xk → x∗ exponentially.
The above result provides a range for the possible learning rates for which (2) converges to a stable
differential Nash equilibrium x∗ of (f1, . . . , fn) assuming agents initialize in a ball contained in the region
of attraction of x∗. Note that the usual assumption in gradient-based approaches to single-objective opti-
mization problems (in which case J is symmetric) is that γ < 1/L, where objective being minimized is
L-Lipschitz. This is sufficient to guarantee convergence since the spectral radius of a matrix is always less
than any operator norm which, in turn, ensures that |1 − γλj | < 1 for each λj ∈ spec(J(x∗)). If the game
is a potential game—i.e., there exists a function φ such that Difi = Diφ for each i which occurs if and only
if Dijfi = Djifj—then convergence analysis coincides with gradient descent so that any γ < 1/L where
L is the Lipschitz constant of ω results in local asymptotic convergence.
The convergence guarantee in Proposition 2 is asymptotic in nature. It is often useful, from both an
analysis and synthesis perspective, to have non-asymptotic or finite-time convergence results. Such results
can be used to provide guarantees on decision-making processes wrapped around the coupled learning pro-
cesses of the otherwise autonomous agents. The next result, provides a finite-time convergence guarantee
for gradient-based learning where agents uniformly use a fixed step size.
Let Br(x∗) be defined as before with the added condition that it be defined to be the largest ball in the
region of attraction such that onBr(x∗) the symmetric part of J—i.e., S ≡ 12(J+JT )—is positive definite.
Theorem 1. Consider a game (f1, . . . , fn) on X = X1 × · · · ×Xn satisfying Assumption 1. Let x∗ ∈ X
be a stable differential Nash equilibrium. Suppose x0 ∈ Br(x∗) and that α < β. Then, given ε > 0, the
gradient-based learning dynamics with learning rate γ =
√
α/β obtains an ε–differential Nash such that
xk ∈ Bε(x∗) ⊂ Br(x∗) for all
k ≥
⌈
2
β
α
log
r
ε
⌉
.
Before we proceed to the proof, let us remark on the assumption that α < β. First, α ≤ β is always
true; indeed, suppressing the dependence on x,
λd(S
TS) ≤ λ1(STS) ≤ σmax(J)2 = λ1(JTJ)
where σmax(·) denotes the largest singular value of its argument. Thus, the condition that α < β is generally
true; for equality to hold, the symmetric part of J(x) would have repeated eigenvalues, which is not generic.
Hence, we include this assumption in Theorem 1, but note that it is not restrictive and is fairly benign.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, note that ‖xk+1−x∗‖ = ‖g˜(xk)− g˜(x∗)‖ where g˜(x) = x−γω(x). Now, given
x0 ∈ Br(x∗), by the mean value theorem,
‖g˜(x0)− g˜(x∗)‖ = ‖
∫ 1
0 Dg˜(τx0 + (1− τ)x∗)(x0 − x∗)dτ‖ ≤ supx∈Br(x∗) ‖Dg˜(x)‖‖x0 − x∗‖.
5
CHASNOV, RATLIFF, MAZUMDAR, AND BURDEN
Hence, it suffices to show that for the choice of γ, the eigenvalues of I−γJ(x) are in the unit circle. Indeed,
since ω(x∗) = 0, we have that
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖xk − x∗ − γ(ω(xk)− ω(x∗))‖2 ≤ supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I − γJ(x)‖2‖xk − x∗‖2
If supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I−γJ(x)‖2 is less than one, then the dynamics are contracting. For notational convenience,
we drop the explicit dependence on x. Since λd(S) ≥
√
α on Br(x∗),
(I − γJ)T (I − γJ) ≤ (1− 2γλd(S) + γ2λ1(JTJ))I ≤ (1− αβ )I
where the last inequality holds for γ =
√
α/β. Hence,
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I − γJ(x)‖2‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− αβ )1/2‖xk − x∗‖2.
Since α < β, we have that (1− α/β) < exp(−α/β) so that
‖xT − x∗‖2 ≤ exp(−Tα/(2β))‖x0 − x∗‖2.
This, in turn, implies that xk ∈ Bε(x∗) for all k ≥ T = d2βα log(r/ε)e.
Note that γ =
√
α/β is selected to minimize 1 − 2γλ1(S) + γ2λd(JTJ). Hence, this is the fastest
learning rate given the worst case eigenstructure of J over the ball Br(x∗) for the choice of operator norm
‖ · ‖2. We note, however, that faster convergence is possible as indicated by Proposition 2 and observed
in the examples in Section 5. Indeed, we note that the spectral radius ρ(·) of a matrix is always less than
its maximum singular value—i.e. ρ(I − γJ) ≤ ‖I − γJ‖2—so it is possible to contract at a faster rate.
We remark that if J was symmetric (i.e., in the case of a potential game [24] or a single-agent optimization
problem), then ρ(I − γJ) = ‖I − γJ‖2. In games, however, J is not symmetric.
3.2 Non-Uniform Learning Rates
Let us now consider the case when agents have their own individual learning rate γi, yet still have oracle
access to their individual gradients. This is, of course, more natural in the study of autonomous learning
agents as opposed to efforts for computing Nash equilibria for a given game.
Proposition 3. Consider an n–player game (f1, . . . , fn) satisfying Assumption 1. Let x∗ ∈ X be a stable
differential Nash equilibrium. Suppose agents use the gradient-based learning rule xk+1 = xk − Γω(xk)
with learning rates γi such that ρ(I − ΓJ(x)) < 1 for all x ∈ V(x∗). Then, for x0 ∈ V(x∗), xk → x∗
exponentially.
The proof is a direct application of Ostrowski’s theorem [26]. We provide a simple proof via Lyapunov
argument for posterity.
Mazumdar and Ratliff [21] show that (2) will almost surely avoid strict saddle points of the dynamics,
some of which are Nash equilibria in non-zero sum games. Note that the set of critical points C contains
more than just the local Nash equilibria. Hence, except on a set of measure zero, (2) will converge to a stable
attractor of x˙ = −ω(x) which includes stable limit cycles and stable local non-Nash critical points.
Letting g˜(x) = x− Γω(x), since ω ∈ Cq for some q ≥ 1, g˜ ∈ Cq, the expansion
g˜(x) = g˜(x∗) + (I − ΓJ(x))(x− x∗) +R(x− x∗)
holds, where R satisfies limx→x∗ ‖R(x − x∗)‖/‖x − x∗‖ = 0 so that given c > 0, there exists an r > 0
such that ‖R(x− x∗)‖ ≤ c‖x− x∗‖ for all x ∈ Br(x∗).
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Proposition 4. Suppose that ‖I − ΓJ(x)‖ < 1 for all x ∈ Br0(x∗) ⊂ V(x∗) so that there exists r′, r′′ such
that ‖I − ΓJ(x)‖ ≤ r′ < r′′ < 1 for all x ∈ Br0(x∗). For 1 − r′′ > 0, let 0 < r < ∞ be the largest r
such that ‖R(x − x∗)‖ ≤ (1 − r′′)‖x − x∗‖ for all x ∈ Br(x∗). Furthermore, let x0 ∈ Br∗(x∗), where
r∗ = min{r, r0}, be arbitrary. Then, given ε > 0, gradient-based learning with learning rates Γ obtains
an ε–differential Nash equilibrium in finite time—i.e., xk ∈ Bε(x∗) for all k ≥ T = d1δ log (r∗/ε)e where
δ = r′′ − r′.
The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 in [2] with a few minor modifications; we provide it in
Appendix A.1 for completeness.
Remark 1. We note that the proposition can be more generally stated with the assumption that ρ(I −
ΓJ(x)) < 1, in which case there exists some δ defined in terms of bounds on powers of I − ΓJ . We provide
the proof of this in Appendix A.1. We also note that these results hold even if Γ is not a diagonal matrix as
we have assumed as long as ρ(I − ΓJ(x)) < 1.
A perhaps more interpretable finite bound stated in terms of the game structure can also be obtained.
Consider the case in which players adopt learning rates γi =
√
α/(βki) with ki ≥ 1. Given a stable
differential Nash equilibrium x∗, letBr(x∗) be the largest ball of radius r contained in the region of attraction
on which S˜ ≡ 12(J˜T + J˜) is positive definite where ω˜ = (Difi/ki)i∈I so that J˜ ≡ Dω˜, and define
α˜ = minx∈Br(x∗) λd
(
S˜(x)T S˜(x)
)
and
β˜ = maxx∈Br(x∗) λ1(J˜(x)
T J˜(x)).
Given a stable differential Nash equilibrium x∗, let Br(x∗) be the largest ball contained in the region of
attraction V(x∗) on which STS is positive definite—i.e.,√α > 0.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that x∗ ∈ X is a stable differential Nash equilibrium.
Let x0 ∈ Br(x∗), α < kminβ,
√
α/kmin ≤
√
α˜, and for each i, γi =
√
α/(βki) with ki ≥ 1. Then, given
ε > 0, the gradient-based learning dynamics with learning rates γi obtain an ε–differential Nash such that
xk ∈ Bε(x∗) for all
k ≥
⌈
2
βkmin
α
log
(r
ε
)⌉
.
Proof. First, note that ‖xk+1−x∗‖ = ‖g˜(xk)− g˜(x∗)‖ where g˜(x) = x−Γω(x). Now, given x0 ∈ Br(x∗),
by the mean value theorem,
‖g˜(x0)− g˜(x∗)‖ = ‖
∫ 1
0 Dg˜(τx0 + (1− τ)x∗)(x0 − x∗)dτ‖ ≤ supx∈Br(x∗) ‖Dg˜(x)‖‖x0 − x∗‖.
Hence, it suffices to show that for the choice of Γ, the eigenvalues of I − ΓJ(x) live in the unit cir-
cle. Then an inductive argument can be made with the inductive hypothesis that xk ∈ Br(x∗). Let
Λ = diag (1/k1, . . . , 1/kn). Then we need to show that I − γΛJ has eigenvalues in the unit circle. Since
ω(x∗) = 0, we have that
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 = ‖xk − x∗ − γΛ(ω(xk)− ω(x∗))‖2 ≤ supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I − γΛJ(x)‖2‖xk − x∗‖2.
If supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I − γΛJ(x)‖2 is less than one, where the norm is the operator 2–norm, then the dynamics
are contracting. For notational convenience, we drop the explicit dependence on x. Then,
(I − γΛJ)T (I − γΛJ) ≤ (1− 2γλd(S˜) + γ
2λ1(JT J)
k2min
)I ≤ (1− 2γ√α/kmin + α/(βkmin))I
= (1− α/(βkmin))I.
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The first inequality holds since λ1(JTJ/k2min) ≥ λ1(JTΛ2J). Indeed, first observe that the singular values
of ΛJTJΛ are the same as those of JTΛ2J since the latter is positive definite symmetric. Thus, by noting
that ‖A‖2 = σmax(A) and employing Cauchy-Schwartz, we get that ‖Λ‖22‖JTJ‖2 ≥ ‖ΛJTJΛ‖2 and
hence, the inequality.
Using the above to bound supx∈Br(x∗) ‖I − γΛJ(x)‖2, we have ‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− αβkmin )1/2‖xk −
x∗‖2. Since α < kminβ, (1−α/(βkmin)) < e−α/(βkmin) so that ‖xk+1−x∗‖2 ≤ e−Tα/(2kminβ)‖x0−x∗‖2.
This, in turn, implies that xk ∈ Bε(x∗) for all k ≥ T = d2βkminα log(r/ε)e.
Multiple learning rates lead to a scaling rows which can have a significant effect on the eigenstructure of
the matrix, thereby making the relationship between ΓJ and J difficult to reason about. None-the-less, there
are numerous approaches to solving nonlinear systems of equations (or differential equations expressed as
a set of nonlinear system of equations) that employ preconditioning (i.e., coordinate scaling). The purpose
of using a preconditioning matrix is to rescale the problem and achieve better or faster convergence. Many
of these results directly translate to convergence guarantees for learning in games when the learning rates
are not uniform; however, in the case of understanding convergence properties for autonomous agents learn-
ing an equilibrium—as opposed to computing an equilibrium—the preconditioner is not subject to design.
Perhaps this reveals an interesting direction of future research in terms of synthesizing games or learning
rules via incentivization or otherwise exogenous control policies for either coordinating agents or improving
the learning process—e.g., using incentives to induce a particular equilibrium while also encouraging faster
learning.
4. Stochastic Setting
In this section, we consider gradient-based learning rules for each agent where the agent does not have oracle
access to their individual gradients, but rather has an unbiased estimator in its place. In particular, for each
player i ∈ I, consider the noisy gradient-based learning rule given by
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γi,k(ω(xk) + wi,k+1) (3)
where γi,k is the learning rate and wi,k is an independent identically distributed stochastic process. In order
to prove a high-probability, finite sample convergence rate, we can leverage recent results for convergence
of nonlinear stochastic approximation algorithms. The key is in formulating the the learning rule for the
agents and in leveraging the notion of a stable differential Nash equilibrium which has analogous properties
as a locally stable equilibrium for a nonlinear dynamical system. Making the link between the discrete time
learning update and the limiting continuous time differential equation and its equilibria allows us to draw on
rich existing convergence analysis tools.
In the first part of this section, we provide convergence rate results for the case where the agents use
a uniform learning rate—i.e. γi,k ≡ γk. In the second part of this section, we extend these results to the
case where agents use non-uniform learning rates—that is, each agent has its own learning rate γi,k—by in-
corporating some additional assumptions and leveraging two-timescale analysis techniques from dynamical
systems theory.
We require some modified assumptions in this section on the learning process structure.
Assumption 2. The gradient-based learning rule (3) satisfies the following:
A2a. Given the filtration Fk = σ(xs, w1,s, w2,s, s ≤ k), {wi,k+1}i∈I are conditionally independent.
Moreovoer, for each i ∈ I, E[wi,k+1| Fk] = 0 almost surely (a.s.), and E[‖wi,k+1‖| Fk] ≤ ci(1 +
‖xk‖) a.s. for some constants ci ≥ 0.
A2b. For each i ∈ I, the stepsize sequence {γi,k}k contain positive scalars such that
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(a)
∑
i
∑
k γ
2
i,k <∞;
(b)
∑
k γi,k =∞;
(c) and, γ2,k = o(γ1,k).
A2c. Each fi ∈ Cq(Rd,R) for some q ≥ 3 and each fi and ω are Li– and Lω–Lipschitz, respectively.
4.1 Uniform Learning Rates
Before concluding, we specialize to the case in which agents have the same learning rate sequence γi,k = γk
for each i ∈ I.
Theorem 3. Suppose that x∗ is a stable differential Nash equilibrium of the game (f1, . . . , fn) and that
Assumption 2 holds (excluding A2b.iii). For each k, let k0 ≥ 0 and
ζk = maxk0≤s≤k−1
(
exp(−λ∑k−1`=s+1 γ`)γs.
Fix any ε > 0 such that Bε(x∗) ⊂ Br(x∗) ⊂ V where V is the region of attraction of x∗. There exists
constantsC1, C2 > 0 and functions h1(ε) = O(log(1/ε)) and h2(ε) = O(1/ε) so that whenever T ≥ h1(ε)
and k0 ≥ N , where N is such that 1/γk ≥ h2(ε) for all k ≥ N , the samples generated by the gradient-
based learning rule satisfy
Pr (x¯(t) ∈ Bε(x∗) ∀t ≥ tk0 + T + 1| x¯(tk0) ∈ Br(x∗))
≥ 1−∑∞s=k0 (C1 exp(−C2ε1/2/γ1/2s ) + C1 exp(−C2 min{ε, ε2}/ζs))
where the constants depend only on parameters λ, r, τL and the dimension d =
∑
i di. Then stochastic
gradient-based learning in games obtains an ε–stable differential Nash x∗ in finite time with high probabil-
ity.
The above theorem implies that xk ∈ Bε(x∗) for all k ≥ k0+dlog(4K˜/ε)λ−1e+1 with high probability
for some constant K˜ that depends only on λ, r, τL, and d.
Proof. Since x∗ is a stable differential Nash equilibrium, J(x∗) is positive definite and D2i fi(x
∗) is positive
definite for each i ∈ I. Thus x∗ is a locally asymptotically stable hyperbolic equilibrium point of x˙ =
−ω(x). Hence, the assumptions of Theorem 1.1 [32] are satisfied so that we can invoke the result which
gives us the high probability bound for stochastic gradient-based learning in games.
The above theorem has a direct corollary specializing to the case where the gradient-based learning rule
with uniform stepsizes is initialized inside a ball of radius r constained in the region of attraction—i.e.,
Br(x
∗) ⊂ V .
Corollary 1. Let x∗ be a stable differential Nash equilibrium of (f1, . . . , fn) and suppose that Assumption 2
holds (excluding A2b.iii). Fix any ε > 0 such that Bε(x∗) ⊂ Br(x∗) ⊂ V . Let ζk, T , and h2(ε) be defined
as in Theorem 3. Suppose that 1/γk ≥ h2(ε) for all k ≥ 0 and that x0 ∈ Br(x∗). Then, with C1, C2 > 0 as
in Theorem 3,
Pr (x¯(t) ∈ Bε(x∗) ∀t ≥ T + 1| x¯(tk0) ∈ Br(x∗))
≥ 1−∑∞s=0 (C1 exp(−C2ε1/2/γ1/2s ) + C1 exp(−C2 min{ε, ε2}/ζs)).
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4.2 Non-Uniform Learning Rates
Consider now that agents have their own learning rates γi,k for each i ∈ I. In environments with several
autonomous agents, as compared to the objective of computing Nash equilibria in a game, it is perhaps more
reasonable to consider the scenario in which the agents have their own individual learning rate. For the sake
of brevity, we show the convergence result in detail for the two agent case—that is, where I = {1, 2}. We
note that the extension to n agents is straightforward. The proof leverages recent results from the theory of
stochastic approximation presented in [9] and we note that our objective here is to show that they apply to
games and provide commentary on the interpretation of the results in this context.
The gradient-based learning rules are given by
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γi,k(ω(xk) + wi,k+1) (4)
so that with γ2,k = o(γ1,k), in the limit τ → 0, the above system can be thought of as approximating the
singularly perturbed system [
x˙1(t)
x˙2(t)
]
= −
[
D1f1(x1(t), x2(t))
τD2f2(x1(t), x2(t))
]
(5)
Indeed, since limk→∞ γ2,k/γ1,k → 0—i.e., γ2,k → 0 at a faster rate than γ1,k—updates to x1 appear to be
equilibriated for the current quasi-static x2 as the dynamics in (5) suggest.
4.2.1 ASYMPTOTIC CONVERGENCE IN THE NON-UNIFORM LEARNING RATE SETTING
Assumption 3. For fixed x2 ∈ X2, the system x˙1(t) = −D1f1(x1(t), x2) has a globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium λ(x2).
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, conditioned on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 < ∞}, (x1,k, x2,k) →
{(λ(x2), x2)| x2 ∈ Rd2} almost surely.
The above lemma follows from classical analysis (see, e.g., Borkar [10, Chapter 6] or Bhatnagar and
Prasad [8, Chapter 3]).
Define the continuous time accumulated after k samples of x2 to be tk =
∑k−1
l=0 γ2,k and define
x2(t, s, xs) for t ≥ s to be the trajectory of x˙2 = −D2f2(λ(x2), x2). Furthermore, define the event
E = {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 <∞}.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. For any K > 0, conditioned on E ,
limk→∞ sup0≤h≤K ‖x2,k+h − x2(tk+h, tk, xk)‖2 = 0.
Proof. The proof invokes Lemma 1 above and Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 of [5]. Indeed, by Lemma 1,
(λ(x2,k)− x2,k)→ 0 almost surely. Hence, we can study the sample path generated by
x2,k+1 = x2,k − γ2,k(D2f2(λ(x2,k), x2,k) + w2,k+1).
Since D2f2 ∈ Cq−1 for some q ≥ 3, it is locally Lipschitz and, on the event {supk
∑
i ‖xi,k‖2 < ∞}, it is
bounded. It thus induces a continuous globally integrable vector field, and therefore satisfies the assumptions
of Proposition 4.1 of [5]. Moreover, under Assumption 2, the assumptions of Proposition 4.2 of [5] are
satisfied. Hence, invoking said propositions, we get the desired result.
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This result essentially says that the slow player’s sample path asymptotically tracks the flow of
x˙2 = −D2f2(λ(x2), x2).
If we additionally assume that the slow component also has a global attractor, then the above theorem gives
rise to a stronger convergence result.
Assumption 4. Given λ(·) as in Assumption 3, the system x˙2(t) = −τD2f2(λ(x2(t)), x2(t)) has a globally
asymptotically stable equilibrium x∗2.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4 and Assumption 4, conditioned on the event E , gradient-
based learning converges almost surely to a stable attractor (x∗1, x∗2), where x∗1 = λ(x∗2), the set of which
contains the stable differential Nash equilibria.
More generally, the process (x1,k, x2,k) will converge almost surely to the internally chain transitive
set of the limiting dynamics (5) and this set contains the stable Nash equilibria. If the only internally
chain transitive sets for (5) are isolated equilibria (this occurs, e.g., if the game is a potential game), then
xk converges almost surely to a stationary point of the dynamics, a subset of which are stable local Nash
equilibria.
It is also worth commenting on what types of games will satisfy these assumptions. To satisfy Assump-
tion 3, it is sufficient for the fastest player’s cost function to be convex in their choice variable.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 2 and 4 hold and that f1(·, x2) is convex. Conditioned on the event E ,
the sample points of gradient-based learning satisfy (x1,k, x2,k)→ {(λ(x2), x2)| x2 ∈ Rd2} almost surely.
Moreover, (x1,k, x2,k)→ (x∗1, x∗2) almost surely, where x∗1 = λ(x∗2).
Note that (x∗1, x∗2) could still be a spurious stable non-Nash point still since the above implies that
D(D2f2(λ(·), ·))|x∗2 > 0, which does not necessarily imply that D22f2(λ(x∗2), x∗2) > 0.
Remark 2 (Relaxation to Local Asymptotic Stability.). Under relaxed assumptions on global asymptotic
stability, we can obtain high-probability results on convergence to locally asymptotically stable attractors. If
it is assumed that x0 is in the region of attraction for a locally asymptotically stable attractor, then the above
results can be stated with only the assumption of a locally asymptotic stability. However, this is difficult to
ensure in practice. To relax the result to a local guarantee regardless of the initialization requires condi-
tioning on an unverifiable event—i.e., the high-probability bound in this case is conditioned on the event
{{x1,k} belongs to a compact setB, which depends on the sample point, of ∩x2R(λ(x2))} whereR(λ(x2))
is the region of attraction of λ(x2). None-the-less, it is possible to leverage results from stochastic approxi-
mation [18], [10, Chapter 2] to prove local versions of the results for non-uniform learning rates. Further
investigation is required to provide concentration bounds for not only games but stochastic approximation
in general.
4.2.2 HIGH-PROBABILITY, FINITE-SAMPLE GUARANTEES WITH NON-UNIFORM LEARNING RATES
In the stochastic setting, the learning dynamics are stochastic approximation updates, and non-uniform
learning rates lead to a multi-timescale setting. The results leverage recent theoretical guarantees for two-
timescale analysis of stochastic approximation such as [9].
For a stable differential Nash equilibrium x∗ = (λ(x∗2), x∗2), using the bounds in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
in Appendix A.2, we can provide a high-probability guarantee that (x1,k, x2,k) gets locked in to a ball around
(λ(x∗2), x∗2).
Let x¯i(·) denote the linear interpolates between sample points xi,k and, as in the preceding sub-section,
let xi(·, ti,k, xk) denote the continuous time flow of x˙i with initial data (ti,k, xk) where ti,k =
∑k−1
l=0 γi,k.
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Alekseev’s formula is a nonlinear variation of constants formula that provides solutions to perturbations
of differential equations using a local linear approximation. We can apply it to the asymptotic pseudo-
trajectories x¯i(·) in each timescale. For these local approximations, linear systems theory lets us find growth
rate bounds for the perturbations, which can, in turn, be used to bound the normed difference between the
continuous time flow and the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories. More detail is provided in Appendix A.2.
Towards this end, fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and let N be such that γ1,k ≤ ε/(8K) and τk ≤ ε/(8K) for all k ≥ N .
Define time sequences t1,k = t˜k and t2,k = tˆk which keep track of the time accumulated up to iteration k
on each of the timescales. Let k0 ≥ N and, with K as in Lemma 2 (Appendix A.2), let T be such that
e−κ1(t˜k−t˜k0 )Hk0 ≤ ε/(8K)
for all k ≥ k0 + T where κ1 > 0 is a constant derived from Alekseev’s formula applied to x¯1(·). Analo-
gously, with K¯ as in Lemma 3 (Appendix A.2), let
e−κ2(tˆk−tˆk0 )(‖x¯2(tˆk0)− x2(tˆk0)‖ ≤ ε/(8K¯),
for all k ≥ k0 + T where κ2 > 0 is a constant derived from Alekseev’s formula applied to x¯2(·). Define
constants
βk = maxk0≤s≤k−1 exp(−κ1(
∑k−1
i=s+1 γ1,i))γ1,s, ηk = maxk0≤s≤k−1
(
exp(−κ2(
∑k−1
i=s+1 γ2,i))γ2,s
)
,
and τk = γ2,k/γ1,k.
Theorem 5. Suppose that Assumptions 2–4 hold and let γ2,k = o(γ1,k). Given a stable differential Nash
equilibrium x∗ = (λ(x∗2), x∗2), player 2’s sample path (generated by (4) with i = 1) will asymptotically track
zk = λ(x2,k). Moreover, given ε ∈ [0, 1), xk will get ‘locked in’ to a ε–neighborhood with high probability
conditioned on reaching Br0(x
∗) by iteration k0. That is, letting k¯ = k0 + T + 1, for some C1, C2 > 0,
P(‖x1,k − zk‖ ≤ ε, ∀k ≥ k¯|x1,k0 , zk0 ∈ Br0) ≥1−
∑∞
k=k0
C1 exp
(− C2√ε/√γ1,k)
−∑∞k=k0 C2 exp (− C2√ε/√τk)
−∑∞k=k0 C1 exp (− C2ε2/βk). (6)
Moreover, for some constants C˜1, C˜2 > 0,
P(‖x2,k − x2(tˆk)‖ ≤ ε, ∀k ≥ k¯|xk0 , zk0 ∈ Br0(x∗)) ≥1 +
∑∞
k=k0
C˜1 exp
(− C˜2√ε/√γ1,k)
−∑∞k=k0 C˜1 exp (− C˜2√ε/√τk)
−∑∞k=k0 C˜1 exp (− C˜2ε2/βk)
−∑∞k=k0 C˜1 exp (− C˜2ε2/ηk). (7)
Corollary 3. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1) and suppose that γ1,n ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ 0. With K as in Lemma 2
(Appendix A.2), let T be such that e−κ1(t˜n−t˜0)H0 ≤ ε/(8K) for all n ≥ T . Furthermore, with K¯ as in
Lemma 3 (Appendix A.2), let e−κ2(tˆn−tˆ0)(‖x¯2(tˆ0) − x2(tˆ0)‖ ≤ ε/(8K¯), ∀n ≥ T . Under the assumptions
of Theorem 5, xk will will get ‘locked in’ to a ε–neighborhood with high probability conditioned on x0 ∈
Br0(x
∗) where the high-probability bounds in (6) holds with k0 = 0.
Remark 3 (Relaxation to Locally Asymptotically Stable Attractors.). In fact, Corollary 3 holds under a
relaxed assumption on the stability of x∗. Indeed, if x∗ is locally asymptotically stable and x0 ∈ Br0(x∗) ⊂
R(x∗) where R(x∗) is the region of attraction for x∗, then the high probability bound from Corollary 3
holds.
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Figure 1: Convergence of policy gradient in LQ dynamic games to the Nash policy. (a) Each player’s linear feedback
gain matrix Ki converges to the unique Nash policies (dotted lines). (b) The black dashed line shows upper bound of
the number of iterations required to converge within ε distance from Nash (2-norm). The actual convergence for this
random initialization is shown as the solid line.
The key technique in proving the above theorem—the complete details are provided in Borkar and
Pattathil [9] which, in turn, leverages results from Thoppe and Borkar [32]—is first to compute the errors
between the sample points from the stochastic learning rules and the continuous time flow generated by
initializing the continuous time limiting dynamics at each sample point and flowing it forward for time
tk+1 − tk, doing this for each x1,k and x2,k separately and in their own timescale, and then take a union
bound over all the continuous time intervals defined for k ≥ k0.
5. Numerical Examples
The results in the preceding sections provide convergence guarnatees for a class of gradient-based learning
algorithms to a neighborhood of a stable Nash equilibrium under deterministic and stochastic gradient-based
update rules with both uniform and non-uniform learning rates. In this section, we present several numerical
examples that validate these theoretical results and highlight interesting aspects of learning in multi-agent
settings.
5.1 Deterministic Policy Gradient in Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
The first example we explore is a linear quadratic (LQ) game with three players in the space of linear
feedback policies. This game serves as a useful benchmark since it has a unique global equilibrium that we
can compute via a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations [4]. The gradient-based learning rule for each
of the agents is a multi-agent version of policy gradient in which agents have oracle access to their gradients
at each iteration.
Consider a four state discrete time linear dynamical system,
z(t+ 1) = Az(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t) +B3u3(t)
where z(t) ∈ R4 and, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ui(t) ∈ R is the control for player i. The policy for each
player is parameterized by a linear feedback gain matrix, ui(t) = −Kiz(t). Moreover, each player seeks to
minimize a quadratic cost
fi(Ki,K−i) = Ez0∼D
[ ∞∑
t=0
(
z(t)TQiz(t) +
∑n
j=1 uj(t)
TRijuj(t)
)]
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which is a function of the coupled state variable z(t), their own control ui(t) and all other agents’ control
u−i(t) over an infinite time horizon. In an effort to learn a Nash equilibrium, each agent employs policy
gradient. In particular, they update their feedback policy via
Ki(t+ 1) = Ki(t)− γi∇Kifi(Ki,K−i).
It is fairly straightforward to compute the gradient of fi with respect to Ki, the feedback gain that parame-
terizes player i’s control input ui. Indeed,
∇Kifi(Ki,K−i) = 2(RiiKi −BTi PiA˜)ΣK
where
ΣK = Ez0∼D
[ ∞∑
t=0
z(t)z(t)T
]
.
Hence, the collection of the agents’ individual gradients is given by
ω(K1,K2,K3) =
(
2(RiiKi −BTi PiA˜)ΣK
)3
i=1
Remark 4. Note that ω can be zero at critical points or at points where
∑∞
t=0 z(t)z(t)
T drops rank. To
prevent the latter possibility, we sample the initial condition from a distribution. That is, we take z0 ∼ D so
that Ez0∼Dz0zT0 is full rank.
For a given joint policy (K1,K2,K3), the closed loop dynamics are A˜ = A−B1K1 −B2K2 −B3K3.
The states z(t) are obtained from simulating the system. For each i, the Riccati matrix Pi is computed by
solving the Riccati equation
Pi = A˜
TPiA˜+Qi +
n∑
j=1
KjRijKj .
Note that this Riccati equation is only used to compute the gradient of the cost functions with respect to a
specific set of feedback gains. The system parameters used in this example are listed in Appendix B.1.
For the purpose of validating convergence, we can compute the Nash policies (K∗1 ,K∗2 ,K∗3 ) by an
established method with coupled Riccati equations, explained in Appendix B.1. We use the learning rate
γi = γ defined as in Theorem 1. To compute γ we first compute the game Jacobian J(K∗1 , K∗2 , K∗3 )
at the Nash feedback gains and then find the maximum eigenvalue of JTJ and minimum eigenvalue of
(JT + J)T (JT + J) in a neighborhood of (K∗1 ,K∗2 ,K∗3 ) to determine the constants α and β as defined in
Section 3.
Figure 1 shows the convergence of the gradient updates to the Nash policies. The Ki are randomly
initialized in a neighborhood of the known Nash equilibrium and such that A˜ is stable. The number of
iterations required to converge to an ε–differential Nash is bounded by the dashed black line in Figure 1b,
which shows the curve of (ε, T ) pairs determined by Theorem 1. However, this learning rate is not optimal,
as choosing a larger γ will result in faster convergence as empirically observed.
Remark 5 (Stochastic Policy Gradient). We note that stochastic policy gradient with an unbiased estimator
has similar convergence properties. Here, e.g., the state dynamics may be subject to zero-mean, finite-
variance noise. As long as the estimator for the gradient is unbiased, the theoretical guarantees of the
proceeding sections apply.
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Figure 2: Gradient dynamics of the matching pennies game where agents learning have different learning rates. The
vector field of the gradient dynamics are stretched along the faster agent’s coordinate.
5.2 Benchmark: matching pennies
The next example is again a multi-agent policy gradient example in which there are two players playing
‘matching pennies’, a classic bimatrix game in which agents have zero-sum costs associated with the matri-
ces (A,B) defined as follows:
A =
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
, B =
[−1 1
1 −1
]
.
In particular, the players aim to minimize their respective costs f1(x, y) = pi(y)TApi(x) and f2(x, y) =
pi(x)TBpi(y) where pi(x) is player 1’s policy and pi(y) is player 2’s policy. The class of policies the agents
are optimizing over are the so-called ‘softmax’ policies defined by
pi(z) =
[
e10z
e10z + e10(1−z)
,
e10(1−z)
e10z + e10(1−z)
]
,
and the update each player employs is a ‘smoothed best-response’ which in essence is a policy gradient
update with respect to the softmax parameter and each agents individual cost. This game has been well
studied in the game theory literature and we use it illustrate the fact that non-uniform learning rates result in
a warping of the vector field associated with the agents’ learning dynamics.
The mixed Nash equilibrium for this game is (x∗, y∗) = (0.5, 0.5), but the Jacobian of the gradient
dynamics at this fixed point is
J(x∗, y∗) =
[
0 100
−100 0
]
so that it has purely imaginary eigenvalues ±100i, and therefore admits a limit cycle. Regardless, we can
visualize the effects of non-uniform learning rates to the gradient dynamics in Figure 2. We notice that the
gradient flow stretches along the axes of the faster agent (the agent with a larger learning rate), and the fixed
points of these dynamics remain constant.
5.3 Exploring the Effects of Non-uniform Learning Rates on the Learning Path
The examples presented so far all consider convergence (or non-convergence) to a single equilibrium. In
the following two examples, we investigate the effect of non-uniform learning rates for more general non-
convex settings in which there are multiple equilibria. The following example is a two-player game in which
the agents’ joint strategy space is a torus. That is, each player’s strategy space is the unit circle S1. For each
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Figure 3: The effects of non-uniform learning rates on the path of convergence to the equilibria. The zero lines for
each player (D1f1 = 0 orD2f2 = 0) are plotted as the diagonal and curved lines, and the two stable Nash equilibria as
circles (whereD21f1 > 0 andD
2
2f2 > 0). (a) In the deterministic setting, the region of attractions for each equilibrium
can be computed numerically. Four scenarios are shown, with a combination of fast and slow agents. The region
of attractions for each Nash equilibrium are warped under different learning rates. (b) In the stochastic setting, the
samples (in black) approximate the singularly perturbed differential equation (in red). Two initializations and learning
rate configurations are plotted.
i ∈ {1, 2}, player i has cost fi : S1 × S1 → R given by
fi(θi, θ−i) = −αi cos(θi − φi) + cos(θi − θ−i)
where αi and φi are constants, and θi is player i’s choice variable. An interpretation of this game is that of
a ‘location game’ in which each player wishes to be near location φi but far from each other. This game has
many applications including those which abstract nicely to coupled oscillators.
The game form—i.e., collection of individual gradients—is given by
ω(θ1, θ2) =
[
α1 sin(θ1 − φ1)− sin(θ1 − θ2)
α2 sin(θ2 − φ2)− sin(θ2 − θ1)
]
, (8)
and the game Jacobian is composed of terms αi cos(θi − φi)− cos(θi − θ−i), i = 1, 2 on the diagonal and
cos(θi − θ−i), i = 1, 2 on the off-diagonal.
The Nash equilibria of this game occur where ω(θ1, θ2) = 0 and where the diagonals of the game
Jacobian are positive. The game has multiple Nash equilibria. We visualize the warping of the region of
attraction of these equilibria under different learning rates, and the affinity of the “faster” player to its own
zero line.
In this example, we use constants φ = (0, pi/8) and α = (1.0, 1.5). The joint strategy space can
be viewed as a non-convex smooth manifold via an equivalence relationship, or equivalently, as players
choosing θi ∈ R. There are two Nash equilibria, situated at (−1.063, 1.014) and (1.408, −0.325). These
equilibria happen to also be stable differential Nash, and thus we expect the gradient dynamics to converge
to them if initialized in the region of attraction. Which equilibrium it converges to, however, depends on the
initialization and learning rates of agents.
To investigate how non-uniform learning rates affect the agents’ convergence to the two equilibria, we
simulate agents learning at different rates, one fast and one slow. The fast agent’s learning rate is set to
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γ1 = 0.171 and the slow γ2 = 0.017. Figure 3a shows the trajectory of agents’ learned strategies. Each of
the four squares depicts the full strategy space on the torus from−pi to pi for both agents’ actions, with θ1 on
the x-axis and θ2 on the y-axis. The labels “fast” and “slow” indicate the learning rate of the corresponding
agent. For example, in the bottom left square, agent 1 is the fast agent and agent 2 is the slow agent. Hence,
the non-uniform update equation for that square becomes θk+1 = θk − diag(γ1, γ2)ω(θk).
The white lines indicate the points x such that ωi(x) = 0, and the intersection of the white lines indicate
points x such that ω(x) = 0. The two intersections marked as circles are the stable differential Nash
equilibria. The unmarked intersections are either saddle points or other unstable equilibria. The black lines
show different paths of the update equations under the non-uniform update equation, with initial points
selected from a equally spaced 7 × 7 grid. We highlight two paths in green (labeled A and B) which begin
at (pi/3, pi/3) and (−pi/3,−pi/3).
In the case where agents both learn at the same rate, (γ1, γ1) and (γ2, γ2), paths A and B both converge
to the Nash equilibrium at (−1.063, 1.014). However, when agents learn at different rates, the equilibrium
to which the agents converge to, as well as the learning path, is no longer the same even starting at the same
initial points. This phenomena can also be captured by displaying the region of attraction for both Nash
equilibria. The red region corresponds to initializations that will converge to the equilibrium contained in
the red region (again indicated by a white circle). Analogously, the blue region corresponds to the region of
attraction of the other equilibria.
To provide an example of the stochastic setting in which agents have an unbiased estimator of their
individual gradients, we choose learning rates according to Assumption 2. In particular, we choose scaled
learning rates γ2,k = 11+k log(k+1) and γ1,k =
1
1+k such that γ2,k/γ1,k → 0 as k →∞. Figure 3b shows the
learning paths in this setting initialized at two different points, each with flipped learning rate configurations.
The sample points approximate the singularly perturbed differential equation (shown in red) described in
Section 4.2.
In both deterministic and stochastic settings, we observe the affinity of the faster agent to its own zero
line. For example, the bottom left square (in Figure 3a) and bottom left path (in Figure 3b) both have agent
1 as the faster agent, and the learning paths both tend to arrive to the line ω1 ≡ 0 before finally converging
to the Nash equilibrium. An interpretation of this is that the faster agent tries to be situated at the bottom
of the “valley” of its own cost function. The faster agent tends to be at its own minimum while it waits
for the slower agent to change its strategy. As a Stackelberg interpretation, where there are followers and
leaders, the slower agent would be the leader and faster agent the follower. In a sense, the slower agent has
an advantage.
5.4 Multi-agent control and collision avoidance
The final example presents a practical use case for the gradient-based update. Consider a non-cooperative
game between four collision-avoiding agents where they seek to arrive at a destination with minimum fuel
while avoiding each other. We show that the scaling between agents’ learning rates dictates the equilibrium
solution to which they converges. This can be useful in designing non-cooperative open-loop controllers
where agents may choose to learn slower in order to deviate less from their initial plan, perhaps in an
attempt to incur less ‘risk’.
Suppose there are four collision-avoiding particles traversing across a unit circle. Each particle follows
discrete-time linear dynamics
zi(t+ 1) = Azi(t) +Bui(t)
for t = 1, · · · , N where
A =
[
I hI
0 I
]
∈ R4×4, B =
[
h2I
hI
]
∈ R4×2,
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4: Minimum-fuel particle avoidance control example. (a) Each particle seeks to reach the opposite side of the
circle using minimum fuel while avoiding each other. The circles represent the approximate boundaries around each
particle at time t = 5. (b) The joint strategy x = (u1, · · · ,u4) is initialized to the minimum fuel solution ignoring
interaction between particles. (c) Equilibrium solution achieved by setting the blue agent to have a slower learning
rate. (d) Another equilibrium, where the red agent has the slower learning rate.
I is the identity matrix, and h = 0.1. These dynamics represent a typical discretized version of the contin-
uous dynamics r¨i = ui in which ui ∈ R2 represents a force vector used to accelerate the particle, and the
state zi = [ri, r˙i] represents the particles position and velocity. Let ui be the concatenated vector of control
vectors for player i for all time—i.e., ui = (ui(1), · · · , ui(N)) and let u = (u1, · · · ,un). Each particle i
aims to minimize a cost defined by
Ji(u) =
N∑
t=1
‖ui(t)‖2R +
N+1∑
t=1
‖zi(t)− z¯i‖2Q +
∑
j 6=i
N+1∑
t=1
ρe−σ‖zi(t)−zj(t)‖
2
S
where ‖ · ‖P denotes the quadratic norm—i.e., ‖z‖2P = zTPz with P positive semi-definite. The first two
terms of the cost correspond to the minimum fuel objective and quadratic cost from desired final state z¯i, a
typical setup for optimal control problems. We use R = diag(0.1, 0.1) and Q = diag(1, 1, 0, 0). The final
term of the cost function is the sum of all pairwise interaction terms between the particles, modeled after the
shape of a Gaussian which encodes smooth boundaries around the particles. We use constants ρ = 10 and
σ = 100.
Figure 4 (a) visualizes the problem setup. Each particle’s initial position zi(0) is located on the left side
of a unit circle; they are separated by pi/5, and their desired final positions, z¯i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
are located directly opposite. The particles begin with zero velocity and must solve for a minimum control
solution that also avoids collision with other particles as described by the objectives Ji for each i.
To initialize the gradient-based learning algorithms in the game setting, we compute the optimal solution
for each agent ignoring the pairwise interaction terms, shown in Figure 4 (b). This can be computed using
classical discrete-time LQR methods or by gradient descent. Then, using this solution as the intialization
for the game setting, each agent descends their own gradient, i.e.
ui,k+1 = ui,k − γiDiJi(u),
with different learning rates γi. Just as the previous example shows, the relative learning rates of agents
warp the region of attraction for the multiple equilibria. If we allow the red agent to learn slower, then the
learning process converges to the equilibria shown in Figure 4 (c), whereas if the blue agent learns quicker,
then we converge to Figure 4 (d). Hence, all else being equal, the learning rates adopted by players greatly
impact the equilibrium to which they converge.
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6. Discussion and Future Work
We analyze the convergence of gradient-based learning for non-cooperative agents with continuous costs.
We leverage existing dynamical systems theory and stochastic approximation literature to provide conver-
gence guarantees for agents that learn myopically—that is, only using information about their own gradient
Difi to update their strategy. We provide guarantees for the case where agents are assumed to have oracle
access to Difi and the case where they have sufficient information to compute an unbiased estimator. We
also study the effects of non-uniform learning rates.
By preconditioning the gradient dynamics by Γ, a diagonal matrix where the diagonals represent the
agents’ learning rates, we can begin to understand how a changing learning rate relative to others can change
the properties of the fixed points of the dynamics. Moreover, players do not know how a change in others’
strategies affects its own cost (Djfi where j 6= i). A possible extension to this paper is to develop update
schemes that use this to provide more robust convergence guarantees for full information continuous games.
Different learning rates amongst agents also affects the region of attraction of the game, hence starting
from the same initial condition, agents may converge to a different equilibria. Agents may use this to their
benefit, as shown in the last example. Such insights into the learning behavior of agents will be useful
for providing guarantees on the design of control or incentive policies to coordinate agents. We also show
through numerical examples that, counterintuitively, if an agent decides to learn slower, a stable differential
Nash equilibrium can go unstable, resulting in learning dynamics that do not converge to Nash.
Beyond the the effects of learning rates, there are a number of avenues for future inquiry. For instance,
the results as stated apply to continuous games with Euclidean strategy spaces. An interesting avenue to
pursue is the study of learning in games where the agents decision spaces are constrained sets or Riemannian
manifolds. The latter arises in a number of robotics applications and in this case, the update rule will
need to be modified by the appropriately defined retraction such as xk+1 = expxk(γk(ω(xk))) [31]. The
former arises in a variety of applications where the learning rules are abstractions of agents learning in, e.g.,
physically constrained environments. The update rule in this case will also need to be defined in terms of
the appropriate proximal map thereby leading to potentially non-smooth dynamics [10, 19] which is even
more challenging in the stochastic setting. Yet, such extensions will lead to a framework and set of analysis
tools that apply to a broader class of multi-agent learning algorithms.
While we present the work in the context of gradient-based learning in games, there is nothing that
precludes the results from applying to update rules in other frameworks. Our results will apply to many other
settings where agents myopically update their decision using a process of the form xk+1 = xk − Γg(xk).
In this paper, we consider the special case where g ≡ [D1f1 · · ·Dnfn]. In the stochastic setting, variants of
multi-agent Q-learning conform to this setting since Q-learning can be written as a stochastic approximation
update.
Finally, as pointed out in [21], not all critical points of the dyanamics x˙ = −ω(x) that are attracting
are necessarily Nash equilibria; one can see this simply by constructing a Jacobian with positive eigen-
values with at least one D2i fi with a non-positive eigenvalue. Understanding this phenomena will help us
develop computational techniques to avoid them. Recent work has explored this in the context of zero-sum
games [22], requiring coordination amongst the learning agents. However, when our objective is to study
the learning behavior of autonomous agents seeking an equilibrium, an alternative perspective is needed.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Deterministic Setting
The following proof follows nearly the same proof as the main result in [2] with a few minor modifications
in the conclusion; we provide it here for posterity.
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Proof Proposition 4. Since ‖I−ΓDω(x)‖ < 1 for each x ∈ Br0(x∗), as stated in the proposition statement,
there exists 0 < r′ < r′′ < 1 such that ‖I − ΓDω(x)‖ ≤ r′ < r′′ < 1 for all x ∈ Br(x∗). Since
lim
x→x∗ ‖R(x− x
∗)‖/‖x− x∗‖ = 0,
for 0 < 1− r′′ < 1, there exists r˜ > 0 such that
‖R(x− x∗)‖ ≤ (1− r′′)‖x− x∗‖, ∀ x ∈ Br˜(x∗).
As in the proposition statement, let r be the largest, finite such r˜. Note that for arbitrary c > 0, there exists
r˜ > 0 such that the bound on ‖R(x− x∗)‖ holds; hence, we choose c = 1− r′′ and find the largest such r˜
for which the bound holds. Combining the above bounds with the definition of g, we have that
‖g(x)− g(x∗)‖ ≤ (1− δ)‖x− x∗‖, ∀ x ∈ Br∗(x∗)
where δ = r′′ − r′ and r∗ = min{r0, r}. Hence, applying the result iteratively, we have that
‖xt − x∗‖ ≤ (1− δ)t‖x0 − x∗‖, ∀ x0 ∈ Br∗(x∗).
Note that 0 < 1− δ < 1. Using the approximation 1− δ < exp(−δ), we have that
‖xT − x∗‖ ≤ exp(−Tδ)‖x0 − x∗‖
so that xt ∈ Bε(x∗) for all t ≥ T = dδ−1 log(r∗/ε)e.
As noted in the remark, a similar result holds under the relaxed assumption that ρ(I − ΓDω(x)) < 1
for all x ∈ Br0(x∗). To see this, we first note that ρ(I − ΓDω(x)) < 1 implies there exists c > 0 such
that ρ(I − ΓDω(x)) ≤ c < 1. Hence, given any  > 0, there is a norm on Rd and a c > 0 such that
‖I − ΓDω‖ ≤ c +  < 1 on Br0(x∗) [25, 2.2.8]. Then, we can apply the same argument as above using
r′ = c+ ε.
A.2 Stochastic Setting
A key tool used in the finite-time two-timescale analysis is the nonlinear variation of constants formula of
Alekseev [1], [9].
Theorem 6. Consider a differential equation
u˙(t) = f(t, u(t)), t ≥ 0,
and its perturbation
p˙(t) = f(t, p(t)) + f˜(t, p(t)), t ≥ 0
where f, f˜ : R× Rd → Rd, f ∈ C1, and f˜ ∈ C. Let u(t, t0, p0) and p(t, t0, p0) denote the solutions of the
above nonlinear systems for t ≥ t0 satisfying u(t0, t0, p0) = p(t0, t0, p0) = p0, respectively. Then,
p(t, t0, p0) = u(t, t0, p0) +
∫ t
t0
Φ(t, s, p(s, t0, p0))f˜(s, p(s, t0, p0)) ds, t ≥ t0
where Φ(t, s, u0), for u0 ∈ Rd, is the fundamental matrix of the linear system
v˙(t) =
∂f
∂u
(t, u(t, s, u0))v(t), t ≥ s (9)
with Φ(s, s, u0) = Id, the d–dimensional identity matrix.
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Consider a locally asymptotically stable differential Nash equilibrium x∗ = (λ(x∗2), x∗2) ∈ X and let
Br0(x
∗) be an r0 > 0 radius ball around x∗ contained in the region of attraction. Stability implies that
the Jacobian J(λ(x∗2), x∗2) is positive definite and by the converse Lyapunov theorem [30, Chapter 5] there
exists local Lyapunov functions for the dynamics x˙2(t) = −τD2f2(λ(x2(t)), x2(t)) and for the dynamics
x˙1(t) = −D1f1(x1(t), x2), for each fixed x2. In particular, there exists a local Lyapunov function V ∈
C1(Rd1) with lim‖x2‖↑∞ V (x2) = ∞, and 〈∇V (x2), D2f2(λ(x2), x2)〉 < 0 for x2 6= x∗2. For r > 0, let
V r = {x ∈ dom(V ) : V (x) ≤ r}. Then, there is also r > r0 > 0 and 0 > 0 such that for  < 0,
{x2 ∈ Rd2 | ‖x2 − x∗2‖ ≤ } ⊆ V r0 ⊂ N0(V r0) ⊆ V r ⊂ dom(V )
where N0(V r0) = {x ∈ Rd2 | ∃x′ ∈ V r0 s.t.‖x′ − x‖ ≤ 0}. An analogously defined V˜ exists for the
dynamics x˙1 for each fixed x2.
For now, fix n0 sufficiently large; we specify this a bit further down. Define the event
Ek = {x¯1(t) ∈ V r ∀t ∈ [t˜k0 , t˜k]}
where
x¯1(t) = x1,k +
t− t˜k
γ1,k
(x1,k+1 − x1,k)
are linear interpolates defined for t ∈ (t˜k, t˜k+1) with t˜k+1 = t˜k + γ1,k and t˜0 = 0. The basic idea
of the proof is to leverage Alekseev’s formula (Theorem 6) to bound the difference between the linearly
interpolated trajectories (i.e., asymptotic psuedo-trajectories) and the flow of the corresponding limiting
differential equation on each continuous time interval between each of the successive iterates k and k+1 by
a number that decays asymptotically. Then, for large enough k, a union bound is used over all the remaining
time intervals to construct a concentration bound. This is done first for fast player (i.e. player 1), to show
that x1,k tracks λ(x2,k), and then for the slow player (i.e., player 2).
Following Borkar and Pattathil [9], we can express the linear interpolates for any k ≥ k0 as x¯1(t˜k+1) =
x¯1(t˜k0)−
∑n
`=k0
γ1,`(D1f1(x`) + w1,`+1) where
γ1,`D1f1(x`) =
∫ t˜`+1
t˜`
D1f1(x¯1(t˜`), x2,`)
and similarly for the w1,`+1 term. Adding and subtracting
∫ t˜n+1
t˜n0
D1f1(x¯1(s), x2(s)), Alekseev’s formula
can be applied to get
x¯1(t) = x1(t) + Φ1(t, s, x¯1(t˜k0), x2(t˜k0))(x¯1(t˜k0)− x1(t˜k0)) +
∫ t
t˜k0
Φ2(t, s, x¯1(s), x2(s))ζ1(s) ds
where x2(t) ≡ x2 is constant (since x˙2 = 0), x1(t) = λ(x2),
ζ1(s) = −D1f1(x¯1(t˜k), x2(t˜k)) +D1f1(x¯1(s), x2(s)) + w1,k+1,
and where for t ≥ s, Φ1(·) satisfies linear system
Φ˙1(t, s, x0) = J1(x1(t), x2(t))Φ1(t, s, x0),
with initial data Φ1(t, s, x0) = I and x0 = (x1,0, x2,0) and where J1 the Jacobian of −D1f1(·, x2).
Given that x∗ = (λ(x∗2), x∗2) is a stable differential Nash equilibrium, J1(x∗) is positive definite. Hence,
as in [32, Lemma 5.3], we can find M , κ1 > 0 such that for t ≥ s, x1,0 ∈ V r, ‖Φ1(t, s, x1,0, x2,0)‖ ≤
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Me−κ1(t−s); this result follows from standard results on stability of linear systems (see, e.g., Callier and
Desoer [11, §7.2, Theorem 33]) along with a bound on∫ t
s
‖D21f1(x1, x2(τ, s, x˜0))−D21f1(x∗)‖dτ
for x˜0 ∈ V r (see, e.g., [32, Lemma 5.2]).
Consider zk = λ(x2,k)—i.e., where D1f1(x1,k, x2,k) = 0. Then, using a Taylor expansion of the
implicitly defined λ, we get
zk+1 = zk +Dλ(x2,k)(x2,k+1 − x2,k) + δk+1 (10)
where ‖δk+1‖ ≤ Lr‖x2,k+1 − x2,k‖2 is the error from the remainder terms. Plugging in x2,k+1, we have
zk+1 = zk + γ1,k(−D1f1(zk, x2,k) + τkλ(x2,k)(w2,k+1 −D2f2(x1,k, x2,k)) + γ−11,kδk+1).
The terms after −D1f1 are o(1), and hence asymptotically negligible, so that this z sequence tracks dynam-
ics as x1,k. We show that with high probability, they asymptotically contract to one another.
Define constant Hk0 = (‖x¯1(t˜k0 − x1(t˜k0)‖+ ‖z¯(t˜k0)− x1(t˜k0)‖) and
S1,k =
k−1∑
`=k0
(∫ t˜`+1
t˜`
Φ1(t˜k, s, x¯1(t˜`), x2(t˜`))ds
)
w2,`+1.
Moreover, let τk = γ2,k/γ1,k.
Lemma 2. For any k ≥ k0, there exists K > 0 such that
‖x1,k − zk‖ ≤K
(
‖S1,k‖+ e−κ1(t˜k−t˜k0 )Hk0 + sup
k0≤`≤k−1
γ1,` + sup
k0≤`≤k−1
γ1,`‖w1,`+1‖2
+ sup
k0≤`≤k−1
τ` + sup
k0≤`≤k−1
τ`‖w2,`+1‖2
)
conditioned on Ek.
In order to construct a high-probability bound for x2,k, we need a similar bound as in Lemma 2 can be
constructed for x2,k. Define the event Eˆk = {x¯2(t) ∈ V r ∀t ∈ [tˆk0 , tˆk]}where x¯2(t) = x2,k+ t−tˆkγ2,k (x2,k+1−
x2,k) is the linear interpolated points between the samples {x2,k}, tˆk+1 = tˆk + γ1,k, and tˆ0 = 0. Then as
above, Alekseev’s formula can again be applied to get
x¯2(t) = x2(t, tˆk0 , x2(tˆk0)) + Φ2(t, tˆk0 , x¯2(tˆk0))(x¯2(tˆk0)− x2(tˆk0)) +
∫ t
tˆk0
Φ2(t, s, x¯2(s))ζ1(s) ds
where x2(t) ≡ x∗2,
ζ1(s) = D2f2(λ(x2,k), x2,k)−D2f2(λ(x¯2(s)), x¯2(s)) +D2f2(xk)−D2f2(λ(x2,k), x2,k) + w2,k+1,
and Φ2 is the solution to a linear system with dynamics J2(λ(x∗2), x∗2), the Jacobian of −D2f2(λ(·), ·), and
with initial data Φ2(s, s, x2,0) = I . This linear system, as above, has bound ‖Φ2(t, s, x2,0)‖ ≤ M2eκ2(t−1)
for some M2, κ2 > 0. Define
S2,k =
k−1∑
`=k0
(∫ tˆ`+1
tˆ`
Φ2(tˆk, s, x¯2(tˆ`))ds
)
w2,`+1.
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Lemma 3. For any k ≥ k0, there exists K¯ > 0 such that
‖x¯2(tˆk)− x2(tˆk)‖ ≤K¯
(‖S2,k‖+ supk0≤`≤k−1 ‖S1,`‖+ supk0≤`≤k−1 γ1,` + supk0≤`≤k−1 γ1,`‖w1,`+1‖2
+ supk0≤`≤k−1 τ` + supk0≤`≤k−1 τ`‖w2,`+1‖2 + eκ2(tˆk−tˆk0 )‖x¯2(tˆk0)− x2(tˆk0)‖
+ supk0≤`≤k−1 τkHk0
)
conditioned on E˜k.
Using the above lemmas, we can get the desired guarantees on x1,k and x2,k as in [9].
Appendix B. Additional Examples
In this appendix, we include additional examples and information about examples contained in the main
body of the text.
B.1 LQ game system parameters
The following are the system parameters and resulting Nash feedback gains computed using the coupled
Riccatti equations:
A =

0.402 1.037 −0.565 0.115
−0.021 −0.990 −0.584 0.457
0.377 1.105 0.698 1.192
−0.177 −0.332 0.237 −0.286
 , B1 =

1
1
0
0
 , B2 =

0
1
1
0
 B3 =

0
0
1
1

Q1 =

0.48 0 0 0
0 0.64 0 0
0 0 0.74 0
0 0 0 0.71
 , Q2 =

0.01 0 0 0
0 0.41 0 0
0 0 0.71 0
0 0 0 0.44
 , Q3 =

1.00 0 0 0
0 0.55 0 0
0 0 0.86 0
0 0 0 0.63
 ,
R11 =
[
5.47
]
, R12 =
[
7.16
]
, R13 =
[
5.31
]
, R21 =
[
5.21
]
, R22 =
[
5.36
]
,
R23 =
[
7.63
]
, R31 =
[
9.71
]
, R32 =
[
2.34
]
, R33 =
[
5.26
]
,
and
K1 =

0.023
−0.201
−0.228
0.104

T
,K2 =

0.060
0.029
0.026
0.274

T
,K3 =

0.033
0.082
0.138
0.177

T
.
We use the following values for constants used in the LQ game: α = 19.4 and 2.90 × 105; hence, we
use γ = 1.52× 10−5.
B.2 Coupled Riccati equations
We require the following standard assumption adopted in LQ games.
Assumption 5. Either (A,B1,
√
Q1) or (A,B2,
√
Q2) is stabilizable-detectable.
Without loss of generality, we assume (A,B1,
√
Q1) is stabilizable-detectable. We employ the following
iterative Lyapunov algorithm for finding the Nash equilibrium to the linear quadratic game [20]:
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step 1. Initialize P (0)1 to be the unique positive definite solution to the Riccati equation,
P
(0)
1 = A
TP
(0)
1 A−ATP (0)1 B1
(
R1 +B
T
1 P
(0)
1 B1
)−1
BT1 P
(0)
1 A+Q1, (11)
and compute the corresponding gain matrix for player 1 by
K
(0)
1 = (R1 +B
T
1 P
(0)
1 B1)
−1BT1 P
(0)
1 A. (12)
Solve for P (0)2 by
P
(0)
2 = A¯
TP
(0)
2 A¯− A¯TP (0)2 B2
(
R2 +B
T
2 P
(0)
2 B2
)−1
BT2 P
(0)
2 A¯+Q1 (13)
where A¯ = A−B1K(0)1 and compute the corresponding gain matrix for player 2 by
K
(0)
2 = (R2 +B
T
2 P
(0)
2 B2)
−1BT2 P
(0)
2
(
A−B1K(0)1
)
. (14)
We note that initializing using this method ensures that the initial closed loop matrix A − B1K(0)1 −
B2K
(0)
2 is stable.
step 2. Given P (k)1 , P
(k)
2 , K
(k)
1 , and K
(k)
2 , update the feedback gains using the following update rules:
K
(k+1)
1 = (R11 +B
T
1 P
(k)
1 B1)
−1BT1 P
(k)
1 (A−B2K(k)2 ) (15)
K
(k+1)
2 = (R22 +B
T
2 P
(k)
2 B2)
−1BT2 P
(k)
2 (A−B1K(k)1 ) (16)
step 3. Update the cost-to-go matrices by solving the Lyapunov equations:
P
(k)
1 = (A¯−B2K(k)2 )TP (k+1)1 (A¯−B2K(k)2 ) + (K(k)1 )TR11K(k)1 + (K(k)2 )TR12K(k)2 +Q1
P
(k)
2 = (A¯−B2K(k)2 )TP (k+1)2 (A¯−B2K(k)2 ) + (K(k)1 )TR21K(k)1 + (K(k)2 )TR22K(k)2 +Q2
step 4. Repeat steps 2–3 until the gains converge.
The extension to n-players is fairly straightforward; more detail can be found in the seminal refer-
ence [4].
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